[1] Also "cleverness" or "quickness of mind", as Aristotle seems to understand δεινότης in the context of his discussion of φρόνησις . Cleverness, Aristotle says, is a capacity which allows one to hit a target at which one is aiming. The goodness or badness of cleverness depends on the quality of the target (σκοπός ) the agent has set before him: if it is fine or noble, cleverness is praiseworthy; if it is base, it is reduced to cunning or mere villainy (πανουργία ). Aristotle stresses that, while prudence is not cleverness, it does not exist without cleverness (Nicomachean Ethics 1144a26-29). Both cleverness and prudence presuppose a certain kind of knowledge (in fact, prudence is a sort of cleverness), but while the former may aim at what is evil (when associated to κακία ), the latter just aims at what is fine or noble. But the actual ability to do the things tending to the proposed end corresponds to cleverness.