Cf. delta 557 and delta 558.
[1] The identification of sciences (or “forms of knowledge”; ἐπιστῆμαι ) and arts (or “technical skills”; τέχναι ) with dispositions and virtues sounds Stoic in character (cf. Stobaeus, Eclogae 2.63.6-7, 2.67.5-12, and especially 2.70.21-71, 6, ed. Wachsmuth). Like the Platonic Socrates, the Stoics were willing to accept the thesis that virtue is a form of knowledge and they added (probably having Aristotle’s discussion of virtue in mind) that virtue is a “disposition”, or rather “a consistent disposition of the commanding part of the soul” (Plutarch, Moralia 441c-d; Diogenes Laertius 7.89; alpha 3830). However, unlike Aristotle, for the Stoics the more stable is the disposition (διάθεσις ), not the state (ἕξις ). For evidence, see Simplicius, In Ar. Cat. 237.25-238.20; Stobaeus, Eclogae 2.71.1-2, ed. Wachsmuth.
[2] Aristotle, unlike Socrates and Plato who make an indistinct use of the terms “art” and “science”, clearly distinguishes both words. According to Aristotle, art and science are two different intellectual virtues having two different objects: science or what one knows scientifically does not admit of being otherwise and is a supposition about universals, i.e. its object is that which cannot be otherwise (see EN 1139b20-24; 1140b31-32). By contrast, art is that which can be otherwise and is concerned with coming to be (EN 1140a10-15, 20-23).
[3] cf. John of Damascus (PG 94.633bc from the beginning to "genre of an art."
[4] Aristotle, Categories 8b35-9a4, more or less directly quoted, from "Those things" to "now call a 'state.'" See web address 1.
[5] cf. epsilon 1767 (end). This is Aristotle’s position: see Cat. 8b26. English "disposition" and "state" do not represent adequately the impermanence of a διάθεσις or the persistence of a ἕξις .