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From the writings of Plotinus. [Pleasures,] pains, recklessness, fears, aversions and to feel pain of mind, to what do they belong? For they belong either to the soul or the soul making use of the body or a third thing composed of both. This latter can be understood in two senses, too: for it is either a mixture or some other thing resulting from a mixture.[1] Definitions of pleasure: 1, a smooth movement; or 2, a perceptible process of generation toward nature; or 3, an irrational relaxation; or 4, an unhindered activity of a natural condition;[2] or 5, an end following the complete activities. Taking these definitions as a starting point, one is able to support and to overthrow the thesis that pleasure is a good and that it is not a good. Pleasure is a smooth movement but distress is a rough movement; and while the former is well-pleasing for every animal, the latter is repulsive. They say that the bodily pleasure that is also an end, is not a pleasure pertaining to a state, the one consisting of taking away of pains of mind, such as freedom from disturbance; they say that bodily pleasure is also an end.[3] The end is different from happiness, for the end is particular pleasure but the structure consisting of particular pleasures with which we measure past and future pleasures, is happiness.[4] And particular pleasure is worth choosing by itself, but happiness is not worth choosing by itself but by particular pleasures. Pleasure is an irrational elation over what seems to be worth choosing.[5] Under it are arranged fascination, joy at another's misfortune, enjoyment, relaxation. Now fascination is a pleasure which fascinates one through one's hearing sense. Joy at another's misfortune is a pleasure at someone else's bad things; enjoyment, as a turning, is a certain conversion of the soul towards the dissolute; relaxation is the dissolving of virtue. There is an acknowledged syllogistic argument of the contradictory position concerning each part "of the thesis whether pleasure is a good or is not a good". The following syllogistic argument shows that pleasure is a good: the good is that at which all things aim.[6] All things aim at pleasure. Therefore, pleasure is good. On the contrary, the argument that shows that pleasure is not a good is the following: the good makes men good. Pleasure does not make men good. Therefore, pleasure is not a good. In fact, pleasure is a smooth movement, but every movement is an incomplete activity.[7] However, no good is incomplete. Consequently, pleasure is not a good.

Ἐκ τῶν Πλωτίνου. Ἡδοναί, λύπαι, θάρρη, φόβοι, ἐπιθυμίαι, ἀποστροφαὶ καὶ τὸ ἀλγεῖν, τίνος ἂν εἶεν; ἢ γὰρ ψυχῆς, ἢ χρωμένης ψυχῆς σώματι ἢ τρίτου τινὸς ἐξ ἀμφοῖν. διχῶς δὲ καὶ τοῦτο. ἢ γὰρ τὸ μῖγμα ἢ ἄλλο τι ἐκ τοῦ μίγματος. Ὅροι ἡδονῆς, α# λεία κίνησις, β# ἢ γένεσις εἰς φύσιν αἰσθητή, γ# ἢ ἄλογος διάχυσις, δ# ἢ ἐνέργεια τῆς κατὰ φύσιν ἕξεως ἀνεμπόδιστος, ε# ἢ τὸ παρακολουθοῦν τέλος ταῖς τελευταίαις ἐνεργείαις. ἐκ τούτων τῶν ὅρων ἰσχύει τις ἀνασκευάζειν καὶ κατασκευάζειν, ὅτι ἀγαθὸν ἡ ἡδονή, καὶ ὅτι μή. Ἡδονὴ δέ ἐστι λεία κίνησις, πόνος δὲ τραχεῖα κίνησις. καὶ τὴν μὲν εὐδοκητὴν πᾶσι ζῴοις, τὸν δὲ ἀποκρουστικόν. ἡδονὴν μέντοι τὴν τοῦ σώματος, ἣν καὶ τέλος εἶναι, οὐ τὴν καταστηματικὴν ἡδονὴν τὴν ἐπ' ἀναιρέσει ἀλγηδόνων καὶ οἷον ἀοχλησίαν τέλος εἶναι φασί. διαφέρει δὲ τέλος εὐδαιμονίας. τέλος μὲν γὰρ εἶναι τὴν κατὰ μέρος ἡδονήν, εὐδαιμονίαν δὲ τὸ ἐκ τῶν μερικῶν ἡδονῶν σύστημα, αἷς συναριθμοῦνται καὶ αἱ παρῳχηκυῖαι καὶ αἱ μέλλουσαι. εἶναί τε τὴν μερικὴν ἡδονὴν δι' αὑτὴν αἱρετήν, τὴν δὲ εὐδαιμονίαν οὐ δι' αὑτήν, ἀλλὰ διὰ τὰς κατὰ μέρος ἡδονάς. Ἡδονὴ δέ ἐστιν ἄλογος ἔπαρσις ἐφ' αἱρετῷ δοκοῦντι ὑπάρχειν. ὑφ' ἣν τάττεται κήλησις, ἐπιχαιρεκακία, τέρψις, διάχυσις. κήλησις μὲν οὖν ἐστιν ἡδονὴ δι' ὤτων κατακηλοῦσα, ἐπιχαιρεκακία δὲ ἡδονὴ ἐπ' ἀλλοτρίοις κακοῖς, τέρψις δὲ οἷον τρέψις, προτροπή τις ψυχῆς ἐπὶ τὸ ἀνειμένον: διάχυσις δὲ ἀνάλυσις ἀρετῆς. ἔστι δὲ περὶ ἑκατέρου μέρους τῆς ἀντιφάσεως συλλογισμὸς ἔνδοξος. ὅτι μὲν ἀγαθὸν ἡ ἡδονή, δείκνυσιν ὁ συλλογισμὸς οὗτος: οὗ πάντα ἐφίεται, ἀγαθόν: τῆς ἡδονῆς δὲ πάντα ἐφίεται: ἡ ἡδονὴ ἄρα ἀγαθόν. τὸ δὲ μὴ εἶναι αὐτὴν ἀγαθὸν ὁ τοιοῦτος: τὸ ἀγαθὸν ἀγαθοὺς ποιεῖ: ἡ ἡδονὴ ἀγαθοὺς οὐ ποιεῖ: οὐκ ἄρα ἡ ἡδονὴ ἀγαθόν. ἡ ἡδονὴ τοίνυν ἐστὶ κίνησις λεία: ἐνέργεια δὲ ἀτελὴς πᾶσα κίνησις: μηδὲν δὲ ἀγαθὸν ἀτελές: ἡ ἡδονὴ ἄρα οὐκ ἀγαθόν.

[1] Plotinus, the founder of Neoplatonism (pi 1811). The passage is taken from Enneads, 1.1.
[2] This is Aristotle's conception of pleasure, EN 1153a12-15. He rejects definition no.2.
[3] These are the Cyrenaic philosophers, the followers of Aristippus (alpha 3908). They maintained that our real end just could be achieved by seeking pleasure, pleasure being bodily pleasure (what Epicurus called "kynematic pleasure", "pleasure in movement). For them the end is particular pleasure and happiness is the "systematic structure" consisting of particular pleasures (see Diogenes Laertius 2.87 and the parallel passage in tau 283). For the dispute between Epicurus and the Cyrenaics, see Diogenes Laertius 10.136-138.
[4] See previous note, and note 1 at tau 283.
[5] All this paragraph contains Stoic definitions of different types of pleasures (see Diogenes Laertius 7.114).
[6] This sentence is literally taken from Aristotle, EN, 1094a2-3.
[7] This last clause is Aristotelian in character. According to Aristotle, the difference between activity (entelecheia; energeia) and movement or change (kinesis) lies in the relation that such activities and movements have to their own ends. In Aristotle's examples, making things, learning, walking and building are movements or changes, insofar as they are incomplete movements. In fact, you are not walking and have walked at the same time, or are building and have built, and so forth. When a builder is in the process of building a house he has not built it yet. In contrast, activities do not aim at an end, they are ends. Thus the end is not beyond the action. That is the reason why the activity is complete or perfect: perfection or completion exists at the same time as the performing of the action (see Metaphysics, 1048b18-35). For this topic cf. Owen (1971-2), Ackrill (1979), Gill (1989) and Natali (1994).

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