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Search results for mu,94 in Adler number:
Headword:
Μαλακός
Adler number: mu,94
Translated headword: delicate, soft, mild
Vetting Status: low
Translation: [Note] that the human being is the most intelligent animal of all, and has the most accurate taste, which is [a sort of] touch, since he is the most delicate and sensitive with regard to touch. For the secretions dissipate faster, and do not make turbid his [faculties of] imagination and reasoning. It should be known that flesh never can be alleged as being a material cause, for insofar it is a contributory [cause][1] it does not produce intelligence. For the movements of the soul, because of their bond, are sympathetically affected by mixture with the body, [and] even though they are not engendered by the mixture, they do not operate such or such a thing without such a mixture. However, if there are some other things having a flesh more delicate than that of man, such as worms, they would obviously be inferior in other respects. For they do not have the complete faculty of imagination; but now we are discussing complete animals. But perhaps the flesh of worms [is not softer], as that of flies is not either. [Note], however, that the human being, on account of having his flesh more delicate, is more intelligent. A sign of it is the fact that the more delicate of men are more intelligent and more noble-natured, and [and the people having] all the other dispositions and natural peculiarities are similarly disposed. This is also why we call stupid people “thick-skinned.”
Greek Original:Μαλακός: ὅτι πάντων φρονιμώτερον ζῷον ὁ ἄνθρωπος καὶ τὴν γεῦσιν, ἁφὴν οὖσαν, ἀκριβεστέραν ἔχει, διότι μαλακώτερος καὶ τὴν ἁφὴν αἰσθητικώτερος: θᾶττον γὰρ διαφορεῖται τὰ περιττώματα, καὶ οὐκ ἐπιθολοῦται αὐτοῦ τὸ φανταστικὸν καὶ λογιστικόν. ἐπιστῆσαι δὲ χρή, μήποτε ὡς ὑλικὸν αἴτιον αἰτιᾶται τὴν σάρκα: οὐ γὰρ ποιητική ἐστι φρονήσεως, ὡς συναίτιον. διὰ γὰρ τὸν σύνδεσμον συνδιατίθεται τὰ ψυχικὰ κινήματα ταῖς τοῦ σώματος κράσεσιν, οὐ γεννώμενα ὑπὸ τῆς κράσεως, ἀλλ' οὐκ ἄνευ τῆς τοιᾶσδε κράσεως τοιῶσδε ἢ τοιῶσδε ἐνεργοῦντα. εἰ δέ τινα εἴη ἄλλα τοῦ ἀνθρώπου μαλακωτέραν ἔχοντα σάρκα, οἱ σκώληκες, τοῖς ἄλλοις δηλονότι ἐλλείπουσιν: οὐ γὰρ ἔχουσι τέλειον τὸ φανταστικόν: ἀλλὰ νῦν περὶ τῶν τελείων ζῴων ὁ λόγος. τάχα δὲ οὐδὲ σὰρξ ἡ τῶν σκωλήκων, ὡς οὐδὲ τῶν μυιῶν. ὅτι δὲ τῷ μαλακωτέραν ἔχειν τὴν σάρκα ὁ ἄνθρωπος φρονιμώτερος, σημεῖόν ἐστι τὸ τοὺς μαλακωτέρους τῶν ἀνθρώπων φρονιμωτέρους καὶ εὐφυεστέρους εἶναι, τῶν ἄλλων ἁπάντων διαθέσεων καὶ φυσικῶν ἰδιωμάτων ὁμοίως ἐχόντων. διὸ καὶ τοὺς ἀνοήτους παχυδέρμους καλοῦμεν.
Notes:
The entry is largely taken from
Philoponus’ commentaries on
Aristotle’s
On the Soul, 388.18-34. For the headword see also
mu 93.
[1] This is one of the forms of causality distinguished by the Stoics and in this context is probably being used in the Aristotelian sense of “efficient” cause. The word
συνεκτικόν is always hard to render (it is derived from the verb
συνέχω ); there is no doubt that, for the Stoics, it is the cause in the strict sense or “the perfect cause” (
Clement,
Stromateis 8.9.33; see also
Cicero,
On fate 41-42, quoting the Stoic theory of causation): “that which is able to produce an effect in an active and self-sufficient way”, and what is indicative of a perfect activity (see
Clement,
Stromateis 8.9, citing Stoic doctrine). For example, a knife is something cutting both in the act of cutting and when it is not cutting. According to Galen, it was the Stoics who introduced for the first time the notion and the name
sunektikon (see Galen,
Synopsis librorum de pulsibus IX, p. 458, ed. Kühn). On this subject see Frede (1980), still the most subtle study on the problem of causality in Stoicism. See also the outstanding and comprehensive book by Bobzien (1998), especially chapters 1-2, and 6. Finally, on the “synectic cause” in Stoicism allow me to refer to Boeri (1992) and (2001).
References:
Boeri, M.D., (1992) “La transmisión del concepto estoico de causa sinéctica”, in Méthexis V, pp. 99-121.
Boeri, M.D., (2001) “The Stoics on Bodies and Incorporeals”, in The Review of Metaphysics, 54, pp. 723-752.
Bobzien, S. (1998) Determinism and Freedom in Stoic Philosophy, Oxford.
Frede, M. (1980) “The Original Notion of Cause”, in Schofield, M. Burnyeat,M., Barnes, J. (eds.) Doubt and Dogmatism. Studies in Hellenistic Epistemology, Oxford, pp. 217-249.
Keywords: aetiology; definition; philosophy; science and technology; zoology
Translated by: Marcelo Boeri on 22 January 2004@14:10:34.
Vetted by:David Whitehead (x-ref; cosmetics) on 2 April 2004@09:48:04.
Catharine Roth (supplemented and tweaked translation, added keywords, other cosmetics) on 7 May 2008@10:36:05.
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