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The word "affection" is spoken of in two ways, for it is what leads either to destruction or to completion. Thus it is said that a piece of wood is affected by fire, meaning that it is brought to destruction; it is also said that sensations are affected by sensible things,[1] meaning that they are fulfilled and are transformed from a potentiality to an actuality. And something passes from the affections of the body to the soul, for the soul sympathizes with a body in pain[2] and rejoices with one that is cheerful. Nobody is unaware that the body, when disposed one way or another, interferes with the soul. This would not occur if a certain sympathy[3] did not pass from the condition of the body to the soul, just as the faculty of memory is affected when the rear chamber of the brain is affected. On affections: the parts of the soul are the five-sense organs, the part that relates to speech and the thinking part, which is thought.[4] Distortion comes to thought from falsehoods and, due to such a distortion, many affections arise which are causes of instability. The affection itself is a movement of the soul which is irrational and contrary to nature, or an impulse which is excessive.[5] The most generic division of affections is into four: pain, fear, appetite, pleasure. It seems to be[6] that the affections are judgments, for greed is a supposition that money is something fine or noble.[7] And the same thing occurs in the case of drunkenness, intemperance and the others. And pain[8] is an irrational contraction and its types are piety, envy, rivalry, resentment, distress, anxiety, folly, agony, confusion. Pity is the type of pain felt for someone suffering undeservedly; envy is pain over someone else's good fortunes; rivalry is a pain that comes from the fact that another person has what one also has oneself; distress is an oppressive pain; anxiety is a disabling pain that makes it difficult to act; folly is a persistent and growing pain that arises in deliberations; agony is an intense pain; confusion is an irrational and tormenting pain which prevents one from perceiving one's circumstances. Immortality is an affection of life or some kind of accident: That immortality is an affection of life or a some kind of accident will be proven on the ground of the hypothesis that the immortal comes to be from the mortal. For the mortal will not be immortal because of participation in another life but because of some kind of accident and affection. In fact, life itself, in being affected, is immortality. But if life becomes immortality as cause of affection, the life of immortality would be affection. Therefore, if what has been affected is not a type of a particular affection (for the affection of what has been affected is a certain coincidence, i.e. an accident, but not a form), life would not be a type of immortality. For neither is the body a type of sweetness nor the soul a type of pleasure or pain.
This topic has also been treated in the [entry] "immortal", but nore broadly there.[9]

Πάθος: ὅτι τὸ τοῦ πάθους ὄνομα διχῶς λέγεται: ἢ γὰρ τὸ εἰς φθορὰν ἄγον ἢ εἰς τελείωσιν. λέγεται γὰρ πάσχειν τὸ ξύλον ὑπὸ τοῦ πυρὸς, ὡς εἰς φθορὰν ἀγόμενον, λέγεται πάσχειν καὶ τὰς αἰσθήσεις ὑπὸ τῶν αἰσθητῶν, ἀντὶ τοῦ τελειοῦσθαι, καὶ ἐκ δυνάμεως εἰς ἐνέργειαν ἄγεσθαι. ὅτι ἐκ τῶν παθῶν τοῦ σώματος διαβαίνει τι πρὸς τὴν ψυχήν: ἀλγοῦντι γὰρ συναλγεῖ καὶ εὐθυμοῦντι συνήδεται. ὅτι καὶ ἐμποδίζει αὐτῇ τὸ σῶμα τοιῶς ἢ τοιῶς διακείμενον, οὐδεὶς ἀγνοεῖ, ὅπερ οὐκ ἂν ἐγένετο, εἰ μὴ διέβαινεν ἀπὸ τῆς πρὸς αὐτὸ σχέσεως συμπάθειά τις ἐπὶ τὴν ψυχὴν οὕτως, ὡς τῆς κοιλίας τοῦ ἐγκεφάλου τῆς ὄπισθεν παθούσης τὸ μνημονευτικὸν πάσχειν. περὶ παθῶν: ὅτι τῆς ψυχῆς μέρη τὰ ε# αἰσθητήρια καὶ τὸ φωνητικὸν μόριον καὶ τὸ διανοητικόν, ὅπερ ἐστὶν ἡ διάνοια. ἐκ δὲ τῶν ψευδῶν ἐπιγίγνεσθαι τὴν διαστροφὴν ἐπὶ τὴν διάνοιαν, ἀφ' ἧς πολλὰ πάθη βλαστάνειν καὶ ἀκαταστασίας αἴτια. ἔστι δὲ αὐτὸ τὸ πάθος ἡ ἄλογος καὶ παρὰ φύσιν ψυχῆς κίνησις ἢ ὁρμὴ πλεονάζουσα. τῶν παθῶν τῶν ἀνωτάτω γένη τέσσαρα, λύπη, φόβος, ἐπιθυμία, ἡδονή. δοκεῖ δὲ τὰ πάθη κρίσεις εἶναι: ἥ τε γὰρ φιλαργυρία ὑπόληψίς ἐστι τοῦ τὸ ἀργύριον καλὸν εἶναι. καὶ ἡ μέθη δὲ καὶ ἡ ἀκολασία ὁμοίως καὶ τὰ ἄλλα. καὶ τὴν μὲν εἶναι συστολὴν ἄλογον, εἴδη δὲ αὐτῆς ἔλεος, φθόνος, ζῆλος, ζηλοτυπία, ἄχθος, ἐνόχλησις, ἀνοία, ὀδύνη, σύγχυσις. ἔλεον μὲν ὡς ἐπὶ ἀναξίως κακοπαθοῦντι, φθόνον δὲ λύπην ἐπ' ἀλλοτρίοις ἀγαθοῖς, ζῆλον δὲ λύπην ἐπὶ τῷ ἄλλῳ παρεῖναι ὧν καὶ αὐτὸς ἔχει, ἄχθος λύπην βαρύνουσαν, ἐνόχλησιν λύπην στενοχωροῦσαν καὶ δυσχωρίαν παρασκευάζουσαν, ἀνοίαν λύπην ἐκ διαλογισμῶν μένουσαν ἢ ἐπιτεινομένην, ὀδύνην λύπην ἐπίπονον, σύγχυσιν λύπην ἄλογον, ἀποκλείουσαν καὶ κωλύουσαν τὰ παρόντα συνορᾶν. ὅτι ἡ ἀθανασία τῆς ζωῆς πάθος ἐστὶν ἢ σύμπτωμά τι. ὅτι δὲ πάθος ἢ σύμπτωμά τι ἡ ἀθανασία τῆς ζωῆς, δειχθήσεται ἐπὶ ὑποθέσει τῇ ἐκ θνητοῦ ἀθάνατον γίγνεσθαι: οὐ γὰρ μεταλήψει ἄλλης ζωῆς ἀθάνατον ἔσται τὸ θνητόν, ἀλλ' ὡς συμπτώματί τινι καὶ πάθει: ἡ γὰρ αὐτὴ ζωὴ παθοῦσα ἀθανασία ἐστίν. εἰ δὲ πάθους αἰτία ἡ ζωὴ ἀθανασία γίνεται, εἴη ἂν πάθος ἡ ζωὴ τῆς ἀθανασίας. εἰ οὖν τοῦ πάθους τοῦ ἰδίου τὸ πεπονθὸς οὐκ ἔστι γένος [σύμπτωμά τι γὰρ καὶ συμβεβηκὸς τὸ πάθος τοῦ πεπονθότος, ἀλλ' οὐκ εἶδος], οὐδ' ἂν τῆς ἀθανασίας γένος εἴη ἡ ζωή: οὐδὲ γὰρ γλυ- κύτητος τὸ σῶμα γένος οὐδὲ ἡδονῆς ἢ λύπης ψυχή. λέλεκται περὶ τούτου καὶ ἐν τῷ ἀθάνατος, ἀλλ' ἐνταῦθα πλατύτερον.

Cf. alpha 705, delta 556.
[1] This sentence looks like a brief paraphrase of the opening lines of Aristotle, Physics 7.3: "That everything which undergoes alteration is altered by sensible causes, and that there is alteration only in things that are said to be affected in their own right by sensible things, can be seen from the following considerations" (transl. R.P. Hardie and R.K. Gaye, in J. Barnes, ed. The Complete Works of Aristotle. The Revised Oxford Translation, Princeton 1984).
[2] That is to say, it shares its affection or "feeling" with another thing.
[3] The Greek word is sympatheia, "co-affection", "affinity".
[4] This distinction is Stoic in character (see Diogenes Laertius 7.110). "The faculty of procreation" (to spermatikon) is not mentioned here, although it is listed in the Stoic doxographies on the parts of the soul. In the Stoic sources the "thinking part" (to dianoetikon) is called "the commanding or ruling part" (to hegemonikon). See Diogenes Laertius 7.110 and Nemesius, On the nature of man 72.7-9 (ed. Morani).
[5] This is the canonical Stoic definition of pathos ("affection", "passion", "emotion") attributed to Zeno of Citium, the founder of the Stoic school (see Stobaeus, Excerpts 2.39.5-9, 2.88.8-10 ed. Wachsmuth; Diogenes Laertius 7.110).
[6] To the Stoics (Diogenes Laertius 7.111; Galen, On the Doctrines of Hippocrates and Plato, V 1, 292, 17-20 ed. De Lacy).
[7] Every affection or emotional state involves a belief or opinion (doxa) that something is good or bad. The cause of appetite is to believe that a good thing is approaching; that of fear is to believe that a bad thing is approaching (Stobaeus, Excerpts, 2.90.8-12 ed. Wachsmuth; Diogenes Laertius 7.111).
[8] The word "pain"(lupe) is not in the text; I follow Diogenes Laertius 7.113, where this definition of pain is given.
[9] See alpha 705.

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