1 See M. Gagarin, ed., Antiphon, The Speeches (Cambridge, 1997) 109, on the use of a "preliminary argument" before the narrative here and in Antiphon 5.8-19. All citations of Antiphon in this paper will refer to Gagarin's text. I am grateful to the Research Board of the University of Missouri for the grant and research leave that have assisted me in completing the present study. This paper is dedicated with affection and admiration to Eugene Numa Lane, my colleague at the University of Missouri for more than twenty years, and is a token of my gratitude for his encouragement and interest in my work on rhetoric and oratory. I hope that the philological aspects of the present study will intrigue him and that he will not be too surprised by the unexpectedly "feminist" turn to my rhetoric.
2 This slave woman was the of Philoneos, a close friend of the prosecutor's father. On her servile status, see Gagarin (1997 above, note 1) 115 and 117; J.H. Thiel, "De Antiphontis Oratione Prima," Mnemosyne 55 (1927) 325; A. Bargazzi, ed., Antifonte Prima Orazione (Firenze, 1955) 87-88; ; E. Heitsch, Antiphon aus Rhamnus (Abh., Akad. der Wiss.und Lit. , geistes-und sozialwiss. Kl., Nr. 3, Mainz, 1984) 22-3 and notes 47 and 53. As the prosecutor reports in his narrative, this concubine gave the potion to both his father and Philoneos. The father lived for twenty more days, but Philoneos, who had been given a larger dose, succumbed immediately.
3 This phrase apparently occurs here and in Antiphon's Third Tetralogy (4.3.1: αὐτὸς μὲν τοῦ τεθνηκότος οὔ φήσι φονεὺς εἶναι) and not elsewhere in extant Attic oratory. I shall not be considering the vexing questions of the authorship of the Tetralogies and their relationship to the rest of Antiphon's work, but E. Carawan's recent arguments, in Rhetoric and the Law of Draco (Oxford, 1998) 172-215, deserve serious consideration. For opposing views and literature, cf. most recently S. Usher, Greek Oratory, Tradition and Originality (Oxford, 1999) 355-9.
4 The hints of an Orestes persona (made explict in 1.17 in the reference to the stepmother as Klytaimnestra) increase the likelihood of fictionalization here, as Antiphon exploits a mythological paradigm. On the Orestes theme, see Thiel (1927 above, note 2) 322; Bargazzi (above, note 2) 15 and 90; B. Due, Antiphon, A Study in Argumentation (Copenhagen, 1980) 20; and E. Hall, "Lawcourt Dramas: The Power of Performance in Greek Forensic Oratory," BICS 40 (1995) 55, who cites the "sly allusion" to Klytaimnestra that "suggests that the speaker is Orestes, offering the woman up to the jurors of Athens." Hall's discussion of drama and oratory assumes that (50) "although a skilled speech-writer like Lysias would presumably develop his characterisation of a particular litigant in a manner designed to emphasise the client's 'real' personality if it were attractive, all the figures presented to the Athenian courts were 'fictive' characters invented by the speech-writers." Her work "treats the speeches as one side of a performed dramatic dialogue where the words of another speech-writer for the presentation of the opponent's case are usually lost to us forever." The degree of collaboration between speech-writer and client is still controversial. See especially, K.J. Dover, Lysias and the Corpus Lysiacum (Berkeley, 1968) 148-73; I. Worthington, "Greek Oratory, Revision of Speeches and the Problem of Historical Reliability," C & M 42 (1991) 55-74, "Once More, the Client/Logographos Relationship," CQ 43 (1993) 67-72, and "History and Oratorical Exploitation," Persuasion: Greek Rhetoric in Action, ed. I. Worthington (N.Y., 1994) 115.
5 J.H. Thiel's two-part study "De Antiphontis Oratione Prima," Mnemosyne 55 (1927) 321-34 and Mnemosyne 56 (1928) 81-92 is an antidote to uncritical acceptance of the prosecutor's account. See K.J. Dover, "The Chronology of Antiphon's Speeches," CQ 44 (1950) 53, who sees the prosecutor's case as "excessively weak, resting as it does upon unsupported hearsay evidence." Carawan's perceptive analysis of strengths, weaknesses, and issues (Carawan (above, note 3) 218-42) somewhat "rehabilitates" the speaker's case.
6 T. A. Schmitz, "Plausibility in the Greek Orators," AJP 121 (2000) 55. To emphasize the oral and rather ephemeral nature of most cases (as compared with those, such as Antiphon 1, for which we have an oration preserved), I would prefer to Schmitz's .
7 Since the prosecutor has no other known siblings, I shall generally refer to these half-brothers as his brothers or his siblings. Fully cognizant that the terminology is not exactly compatible with Athenian practice, I shall occasionally refer to the brother conducting the defense as the defense counsel. My allusions to the "sons" of the stepmother presuppose the existence of the defense counsel and at least one legitimate full brother who would be listed among the prosecutor's opponents (and, hence, among the defendant's supporters) and played at least some role in the defense of his mother. An interesting later example of brother vs. brother opposition is the prooemium of Dem. 40 (Mantitheus against Boeotus II 1-5), a private suit over the dowry of Mantitheus' mother. In that case, the plaintiff is attacking two men who, on the basis of claims by their mother Plangon, have had to be recognized as his brothers, products of an extramarital liaison between his father and Plangon. Obviously, the situation is reversed in Antiphon 1, where the plaintiff is a (see note 16 below). It is ironic that the father's avenger in Antiphon 1 is the , not the legitimate sons, but the prosecutor can at least imply that he is the only one acting as a legitimate son ought to. See Dem. 40.46-8 and Usher (above, note 3) 261, for Mantitheus's remarks on the behavior of a true son, and Apollodorus' attack against his brother Pasicles in Dem. 45.83-4, expressing doubts about Pasicles' parentage.
8 Acknowledging fate as a additional cause, the prosecutor says (1.2): ἡ γὰρ τύχη καὶ αὐτοὶ οὗτοι ἠνάγκασαν ἐμοὶ πρὸς τούτους αὐτοὺς τὸν ἀγῶνα καταστῆναι, οὓς εἰκὸς ἦν τῷ μὲν τεθνεῶτι τιμωροὺς γενέσθαι, τῷ δὲ ἐπεξιόντι βοηθούς. On the possibilities of a settlement, see Carawan (above, note 3) 221-3 and 227-9. In The Litigious Athenian (Baltimore, 1998) 168-73, listing numerous examples, M. Christ cites social pressure against suits brought by relatives against relatives. See also V. Hunter, Policing Athens, Social Control in the Attic Lawsuits, 420-320 B.C. (Princeton, 1994) 48-55 and Due (above, note 4) 16 and 22.
9 On Antiphon's use of the participle as a substantive, see the examples in C. Cucuel, Essai sur la langue et le style de l'orateur Antiphon (Paris, 1886) 117-20. Here the parallelism, strengthened by and , separates out the prosecuting son and ties him to his father.
10 See 1.5, where the prosecutor must be referring to the brother who is speaking on behalf of the defendant. In view of the allegations in the prooemium, however, more than one brother would seem to be risking the "taint" of impiety. Concerning the positions of the prosecutor and the defense counsel, Due (above, note 4) 17, notes that in sections 5-13, "the speaker turns to his brother and criticizes his understanding of the notion of . To him it apparently only implies a command not to betray his mother, while the speaker finds it much more impious to deprive their dead father of the revenge due him." The insistence on the priority of revenge for a father as opposed to loyalty toward a mother is consonant with the Orestes/Klytaimnestra theme that underlies the speech. Is the prosecutor implying that he could have brought a against his brother (or brothers) but has chosen instead to prosecute his stepmother? On the in general and its application, see Carawan (above, note 3) 152-3; R. Osborne, "Law in Action in Classical Athens," JHS 105 (1985) 51-2 and 55-9; S. Todd, The Shape of Athenian Law (Oxford, 1993) 106 and 307-315. Carawan (229) points out that, if he secures a conviction of his stepmother, the prosecutor might then take his brothers to court again, this time charging them with impiety for "knowingly harbouring their father's killer."
11 Literature on the torture challenge is extensive, especially with regard to the likelihood of its actual acceptance. I shall not deal with that question here but instead refer the reader to the following sources which I have found most useful: G. Thur, Beweisführung vor den Schwurgerichtshöfen Athens: die Proklesis zur Basanos (Sitz. Akad. der Wiss. Wien, phil.-hist. Kl. 317.7, 1977) and "Reply to D. C. Mirhady: Torture and Rhetoric in Athens," JHS 116 (1996) 132-4; S. Todd, "The Purpose of Evidence in Athenian Courts," Nomos, Essays in Athenian Law, Politics, and Society, ed. P. Cartledge, P. Millett, and S. Todd (Cambridge, 1990) 19-39, esp. 27-36, and Todd (above, note 10) 96 and note 22; Hunter (1994 above, note 8) 89-95 and 133-4; M. Gagarin, "The Torture of Slaves in Athenian Law," CP 91 (1996) 1-18; and D. C. Mirhady, "Torture and Rhetoric in Athens," JHS 116 (1996) 121-31, and "The Athenian Rationale for Torture," Law and Social Status in Classical Athens, ed. V. Hunter and J. Edmondson (Oxford, 2000) 53-74.
12 (1.1): νέος μὲν καὶ ἄπειρος δικῶν ἔγωγε ἔτι, δεινῶς δὲ καὶ ἀπόρως ἔχει μοι περὶ τοῦ πράγματος... Although emphasized by the paronomasia of and here, the pose of is a commonplace. On the commonplace, see Gagarin (1997 above, note 1) 107; Usher (above, note 3) 28. For other examples of the commonplace, see Bargazzi (above, note 2) 73, and Due (above, note 4) 11 and 27, n. 3.
13 See Gagarin (1997) above, note 1) 106-7 and 121.
14 As Usher (above, note 3) 28, observes, given the difficulties of the case, "Antiphon had to use literary and rhetorical means to create the required prejudice against the defense." See Wilamowitz, "Die erste Rede des Antiphon," Hermes 22 (1887) 199.
15 See Carawan (above, note 3) 220. If he is handling something as important as this case, this son must be his mother's only or principal . On , see also note 25 below. There is no clear evidence for the relative age or number of any other siblings. See note 7 above.
16 Carawan (above, note 3) 220 observes that "the manuscript hypothesis assumes that the plaintiff is a legitimate son of the victim by a previous marriage; but commentators have reached a virtual consensus that the plaintiff is in fact a later offspring, probably a freeborn son of the victim by a concubine, possibly non-Athenian." See Thiel (1927 above, note 2) 322-3; Heitsch (above, note 2) 22 and notes 44 and 45. Representing a minority view, D. Ogden, Greek Bastardy in the Classical and Hellenistic Periods (Oxford, 1996) 191, argues in favor of the prosecutor's legitimacy. While I agree with Carawan and Heitsch () that she possibly was a non-Athenian, I do not find the linguistic evidence for the status of the prosecutor's mother convincing. Commenting on that evidence, Dover (1950 above, note 5) 51, n.2, agrees that the young man must be illegitimate. Dover adds, however, "we do not know that his mother was non-Athenian, and, even so, why should he use his mother's pronunciation rather than his father's?" If the stepmother really did intend to have a love potion and not poison administered to her husband, the liaison with the prosecutor's mother is a likely proximate cause. See note 23 below. We might wonder, however, why the defendant waited so long before taking this action (if we assume on the basis of the prosecutor's likely age that the liaison began about thirteen or fourteen years earlier). Was she unusually patient or did she make earlier attempts or is she actually innocent of the charges?
18 Such claims are likely in view of the frequent citations of "good citizenship" that occur so often in Attic oratory. Antiphon 2.2.12 could serve as a "check list" for someone who wanted to illustrate behavior appropriate for a citizen. See, for example, Lysias 12.3-4 (no law suits) and 7.30-33 (munificent public service); Isaeus 4.27-28 (army service; various contributions; law-abiding lives); Isaeus 7.36 (); Dem. 21.13-4 (assumption of ) and 153-63 (comparison of service of Demosthenes and Meidias); Dem. 50.2-3 and 57-66 (trierarch). Too much emphasis on service could provoke envy and hostility. See Christ (above, note 8) 41-2; J. Ober, Mass and Elite in Democratic Athens (Princeton, 1989) 199-230; Lysias 7.32. A reputation for minding one's own business also could be an asset, as L. B. Carter, The Quiet Athenian (Oxford, 1986) has shown. See especially Carter, 108-9 on the in Lysias 19 (notably 19.18 and 19.55). The Choregos in Antiphon 6 perhaps had reason to regret his public service, although, for obvious reasons, he stresses his meticulous fulfillment of his duties (6.11-14). On the wealth and status of typical "disputants," Hunter (1994 above, note 8) 52, comments: "on the whole, there seems no reason to quarrel with the view that most disputants are members of the propertied class or even the elite. On the other hand, in their midst appear a whole series of individuals who might be better described as poor relatives." If he did not share in his father's estate, the in Antiphon 1 might be trying to use this trial to get back into the "propertied class." Of course, he has had sufficient means to hire Antiphon as his speechwriter. See Gagarin (1997 above, note 1) 114.
19 As we shall see below (see at note 22 ff.), the defendant also goes unnamed in the speech. Even though her identity presumably would have been clear to the audience, the omission of her name has connotations different from the omission of that of the victim.
20 Concerning the position of a , see especially, C. Patterson, "Those Athenian Bastards," ClAnt 9 (1990) 40-73; R. Sealey, "On Lawful Concubinage in Athens," ClAnt 3 (1984) 111-33, and Women and the Law in Classical Greece (Chapel Hill 1990) 15-16 and 112-3; Todd (1993 above, note 10) 178-9 and 211; Ogden (above, note 15) 151-163 and 189-212; C.A. Cox, Household Interests, Property, Marriage Strategies, and Family Dynamics in Ancient Athens (Princeton, 1998) 170-3.
21 As we shall see below (at note 37 ff.), the prosecutor will use the (1.14-20) in part to contrast the behavior of his father and his stepmother and to elicit sympathy for the victims of the crime.
22 Except for allegedly less than respectable women (at least, those as presented by litigants on the opposite side), most women in extant speeches are anonymous. See D. M. Schaps, "The Women Least Mentioned: Etiquette and Women's Names," CQ 27 (1977) 323-30 and Todd (1993 above, note 10) 201. Noteworthy examples letting us see both sides are Dem. 36.8 and 36.30-32 (For Phormio) where the defense avoids naming Phormio's wife, who happens to be the mother of Apollodorus, the plaintiff, and Dem. 45 (Against Stephanus),where the same Apollodorus avoids mentioning the name of his mother, in spite of his hints that her conduct has been less than stellar (see sections 3-4 and 83-4). At Dem. 45.74, however, Apollodorus skirts the proprieties a bit and lets his mother's name "slip" into public notice when he quotes a clause from his father's will that mentions her by name (Archippe). See Dem. 40, where the plaintiff frequently mentions Plangon by name (see sections 2, 8-11, 20, 27, etc.), since it is in his interest to challenge her respectability and, by implication, that of his alleged half-brothers. On Plangon's status, see especially Hunter (1994 above, note 8) 29-30, 32-3, 42, and 114. Using Archippe's case as one instance, L. Foxhall, "The Law and the Lady: Women and Legal Proceedings in Classical Athens," Greek Law in its Political Setting, Justifications Not Justice, ed. L. Foxhall and D. E. Lewis (Oxford 1996) 141, observes that "women who are not on trial can also be subject to brutal accusations from their legal opponents or those of their menfolk."
23 See note 16 above. Mantitheus in Dem. 40 cites his own mother (carefully unnamed, see Schaps above, note 22, 324-26) as a proper wife and mother, especially as compared with Plangon. Is the prosecutor in Antiphon 1 able to make similar claims about his mother? His failure to mention her in this case may reflect deference to propriety. Another likely scenario, however, is that her status as his father's concubine makes her son vulnerable and could diminish his stature before the jury in comparison with his siblings. Gagarin (1997 above, note 1) 114-5 has noted that the prosecutor is careful to identify the guilty concubine as Philoneos', "suggesting that the speaker is concerned that the jurors might think of the other , his mother." At any rate, it makes sense for her son to avoid mentioning her. Except for giving birth to him, his mother has no apparent connection to the case beyond her liaison (of uncertain time and duration) with his father. The prosecutor cannot stress this liaison as his stepmother's motive for murder without violating his mother's privacy and perhaps making the jury wonder whether there is a jealous woman involved on his side of the case as well.
24 Gagarin (1997 above, note 1) 114 comments that, while the prosecutor needs to show that the defendant wanted revenge, "...if he gives details about the wrong she suffered, he will make it easier for the defense to portray her as the victim of a cruel husband. So we are not told what wrong was done her, though we may guess that one factor was probably her husband's mistress or concubine (the speaker's mother...)." Linked to his consideration for his wife and mother (αἰσχυνόμενος τήν τε γυναῖκᾳ καὶ τὴν μητέρα τὴν αὑτοῦ πρεσβυτέραν τε οὖσαν καὶ ἐν τῷ αὐτῷ διαιτωμένην), Lysias' housing of his hetaira with a friend, not at his own home ([Dem.] 59. 21-2), seems to illustrate the proper "etiquette" for balancing a wife and mistress. Did the speaker of Antiphon 1 live as a at his father's home rather than with his mother or her family? If so, his presence as a (and reminder of her husband's concubine) could have been an additional irritant for the stepmother. His reference to the upper room in "our house" and his alleged attendance on his dying father are the only clues to his living arrangements and are insufficient for a conclusion.
25 Citing the law in Dem. 46.18 "indicating those relatives who were legally entitled to give a woman's hand in marriage (by )" and so to be , Hunter (1994 above, note 8) 16-17 notes that "the list includes her father, followed by her homopatric brother, and then her paternal grandfather: her closest agnates." These were not a woman's only possible , however. See Hunter (1994 above, note 8) 18-19; Todd (1993 above, note 10) 209-210; and L. Foxhall (1996 above, note 22) 150.
26 See Pericles' famous admonition to women, as presented by Thucydides (2.45.2), which Schaps (above, note 22) 323, uses as a starting point in his discussion of the propriety of naming women in court.
27 In their editions of Antiphon, F. Blass (Leipzig, 1892), L. Gernet (Paris, 1954), and A. Bargazzi (Firenze, 1955) use the spelling Κλυταιμνήστρας, while Gagarin's text has Κλυταιμήστρας. On this question of orthography, see P. Marquardt, "Clytemnestra: A Felicitous Spelling in the Odyssey," Arethusa 25 (1992) 241-54.
28 See note 22 above on the indirect method used by Apollodorus in Dem. 45, a method considerably less dramatic than the one here. It is interesting to note that Orestes does not mention his mother by name in his "defense" speech at the end of Aeschylus' Choephoroi and that no one in the trial scene at Athens in the Eumenides names Klytaimnestra. Are Orestes and the deities involved also "following the rules"? The omission of Agamemnon's name as well might indicate that the victim and murderess were too obvious to need naming. Yet, merely mentioning his name in public would not insult Agamemnon. At any rate, it is ironic that here in Antiphon 1 the prosecutor "disgraces" Klytaimnestra by invoking her name with malicious symbolism instead of naming his stepmother.
29 I am looking ahead a bit here to Aristotle (Po. 1454a23-4: ἀλλ ) οὐχ ἁρμόττον γυναικὶ τὸ ἀνδρείαν ἢ δεινὴν εἶναι. ), but I assume that the philosopher's remarks reflect a fairly common attitude. See Hall (above, note 4) 49-50 on this passage from the Poetics, to which she adds Rhet. 1.1356a 1-13 and 3.1408a 25-31.
30 Translating this as "planned and premeditated," Gagarin (1997 above, note 1) 108 comments that "the first term is common in this sense, the second occurs only here and in 1.5 in classical Greek."
31 As Due (above, note 4) 12-3, has observed, the prosecutor is slow to reveal that the purpose of the is to provide evidence not about the murder but only about former attempts. After section 9 reveals this purpose, "in the rest of the passage the argumentation is carried on as if it concerned the actual murder." Discussing the torture challenge, Carawan (above, note 3) 237 argues that information sought in questioning of the slaves "goes directly to the issue of , that she knew or should reasonably have anticipated the lethal consequences." Although in the prooemium he stressed the multiplicity of attempts (1.3: καὶ μὴ ἅπαξ ἀλλὰ πολλάκις), in the the speaker seems to refer to only one other attempt (1.9: kai; provteron ktl. ). See Bargazzi (above, note 2) 76 and 82-3, and Gagarin (1997 above, note 1) 108. This latter scenario would seem more likely, and we should consider 1.3 as "oratorical license" to exaggerate. On the other hand, the plural in 1.9, even if a case of a generalizing plural, could give one pause.
32 See, for instance, the following examples of these topoi, used by prosecutors or defense: a.) culpability/evil intentions: Antiphon 2.1.5-7; Antiphon 4.1.6; Antiphon 4.3.4-6; Lysias 1. 15-7; Lysias 4.8-11; Dem. 54.22-5; Dem. 21.41-3, 74; b.) lack of restraint: Antiphon 2.1.7-8; Lysias 3.5-9; Dem. 21.17, 41, 66, 79; [Dem.] 2554-8; c.) violation of the laws: Lysias 1.26 and 31-36; Dem. 21.2, 20-1; d.) lack of pity: Dem. 21.95-7; [Dem.] 25.83-4; e.) lack of respect for gods, etc.: Dem. 54.39; [Dem.] 59.107 and 117; Dem. 21.33-5, 51, 104-5. While their underlying framework is similar to that of corresponding topoi in Antiphon 1, each of these examples, with the possible exception of those from Antiphon 2 and 4 , is far more developed. The assumption that these and similar topoi were developed with male defendants in mind seems reasonable. Still, the forms are general enough to be applicable to practically any human defendant, male or female, Greek or foreigner.
33 The prosecutor's version of the case requires that the defendant be identified as a woman who has succeeded in causing the death of her husband after previous attempts. The basic framework of each topos is not affected by this version or by the defendant's gender. In fact, the topoi are so sketchy that they barely go beyond their abstract form.
34 His use of ὡς οἶμαι (1.6) makes this obvious, no matter what the arrangements were at his father's home. Certainly, the stepmother would not have spoken openly of her plan in front of her stepson. He is either using his imagination or at best has drawn some information from the confession of the . As is the case with his rest of the speech, the prosecutor brings forward no witnesses or depositions to substantiate his claims. He presumably wants his audience to assume that his scenario rests on a confession extracted by torture. On that confession, however, see Thiel (1927 above, note 2) 325-33.
35 Given the limited excursions outside the home available for a woman of the stepmother's apparent status, there is little likelihood that the stepmother would have sought out or associated with the concubine elsewhere. Gernet (above, note 27) deletes πυθομένη, commenting (42) that "scholium videtur pro αἰσθομένη sq. versus." Gagarin (1997 above, note 1), however, retains πυθομένη, arguing (114) that it "designates a general perception of events," while αἰσθομένη designates "an understanding of the injustice involved."
36 The aorist ἐποιήσατο need not imply a continuing relationship but also does not utterly preclude one. The narrative seems to imply that the friendship began when the stepmother found out Philoneos' intentions, but this is not necessarily the case.
37 The syntax reinforces the distinction between the two women. Discussing Bargazzi's observations (above, note 2, 21 and 88-9) on the clarity of the narrative, Gagarin (1997 above, note 1) 115, comments that "the stepmother is the subject of all of the verbs of speaking and main verbs in indirect discourse until ὑπέσχετο, while the is either an object of verbs or the subject of subordinate verbs. This reinforces the impression that the stepmother is the primary agent, the her subordinate." I would maintain that it also reinforces the difference in status between the two.
39 The rites for Zeus Ktesios would have taken place in Philoneos' home. See Gagarin (1997 above, note 1) 115.
40 In 1.14, the speaker describes Philoeos as a "gentleman" ( καλός τε καὶ ἀγαθὸς καὶ φίλος τῷ ἡμετέρῳ πατρί). See Gagarin (1997 above, note 1) 114, who observes that "both men appear to be fairly prosperous."
41 As presented by the speaker, the concubine, in danger of relegation to a brothel, has more reason to act than the stepmother does. The prosecutor is almost dismissive in noting that the defendant claimed that her husband was wronging her. His presentation reflects his aim in the narratio is to create sympathy for the male victims and to avoid giving any details that could mitigate his stepmother's guilt. See note 24 above.
42 See Hall (above, note 4) 46-49 on delivery in drama and oratory. While one might assume that delivery is more important at the beginning and conclusions of speeches, the narratio offers special opportunities. For example, Hall, 54, has observed that a litigant could use his narrative "to do things forbidden by the conventions of the court, such as recount speeches by people who could not be witnesses themselves." Moreover, "female utterances are often delivered in direct speech to great effect, although women could not normally be used as witnesses." The speaker in Antiphon 1 does not substitute direct speech for female testimony. His skilful recounting of both the conversation in the women's quarters and the pallake's deliberations at the scene of the murder, however, allow him to use the women as witnesses indirectly. Since the prosecutor does not (and probably cannot) produce corroborating witnesses or the concubine's actual confession, his delivery must add verity to the narrative. Unfortunately, we have no way of determining whether the prosecutor's skill at delivery matched the verbal talents of his logographer.
43 I agree with Gagarin (1997 above, note 1) 116, that these words are not "an intrusive gloss" but instead are typical of the prosecutor who "tends to spell out such details." In this case, the detail is important as a reminder that the defense counsel has chosen the "wrong" side.
44 The prosecutor has to tread carefully with this topic. He cannot distance his stepmother so far from his father that he eliminates the horror (not to mention the fear) jurors should feel at the thought of a wife compassing the death of her husband.
46 We may contrast Dem. 40.1 where Mantitheus refers to his father Mantias as "my father" (τὸν πατέρα μου), not as "our father", thereby not so subtly indicating that he does not acknowledge the parentage of his brothers. This verbal emphasis on himself as the only true son is a carry-over from Dem. 39, but the level of hostility seems to have increased. Compared to Dem. 40, moreover, Dem. 39 is relatively civil. At least in Dem. 39, with the exception of one reference to his brother Boiotos as "the son of Plangon" (39.0), Mantitheus "politely" refers to his opponents' mother as their mother or as the daughter of Pampilus (e.g., 39.2). At any rate, Demosthenes' rhetorical exploitation of possessives and/or epithets would seem to offer support for the relevance of Antiphon's usage here.
47 Despite 1.2: αὐτοὶ γὰρ οὗτοι καθεστᾶσιν ἀντίδικοι καὶ φονεῖς, ὡς καὶ ἐγὼ καὶ ἡ γραφὴ λέγει. The case itself was a δίκη φόνου, not a γράφη.. On the distinction, see, e.g., Todd (1993 above, note 10) 98-112. Gagarin (1997 above, note 1) 108 comments that for this case "the accusation entered with the was evidently written". We know that they are his , but did the prosecutor actually name his brothers as murderers in his written accusation? We would be mistaken to think so. The stronger assumption is that the speaker is aware of the shock value of leaving a quick, even if inexact, impression that his brothers have somehow officially been linked to their mother as accused murderers (see Schmitz at note 6 above). As , the eldest son would bear the brunt of his opponent's accusations, but I see no reason to exclude the other brother(s) completely. For example, if he (or they) were actively assisting the in the defense, they might have taken the along with him and so have been liable to their opponent's censure. On the , see D. M. MacDowell, The Law in Classical Athens (Ithaca, 1978) 119, and Athenian Homicide Law in the Age of the Orators (Manchester, 1963) 90-100. See also Todd (1993 above, note 10) 96 n.21 and 273; R. J. Bonner and G. Smith, The Administration of Justice from Homer to Aristotle (Chicago, 1930; reprinted NY, 1970) II. 165-173 and 222.
48 Noting the hendiadys of τόλμης and διανοίας, Gagarin (1997 above, note 1) 120 translates the two as "audacious thinking." I prefer "reckless" because it seems better to reflect the pejorative sense of the Greek.
49 At this juncture, would the speaker have allowed a bit of scorn to creep into his voice as he mentioned his brother? Needing his connection with them to maintain the pathos of his dilemma, the would not want to disavow his brother(s), but he can still do his best to denigrate them.
51 For example, the prosecutor refers to his half-brothers as opponents but then in the attacks only one brother. See note 7 and note 10 above and Gagarin (1997 above, note 1) 107: "one brother presumably presented the entire defense, but the orators use the singular (1.5 etc.) or plural almost indiscriminately in referring to the opposing side." The plural φονεῦσι is be intentionally vague at this point. If he actually did refer to murderers (see 1.29-30), the victim might have meant his wife and the concubine.
52 See Hall (above, note 4) 57 on the courts as "an arena for competitive social performances." R. Osborne, "Religion, Imperial Politics, and the Offering of Freedom to Slaves," in Hunter and Edmondson (2000 above, note 11) 80, comments that "court cases are about the redistribution of honour; to be allowed to compete there is to be allowed to acquire honour, indeed to acquire differential honour."
53 On women in court, see Neaera in [Dem.] 59; Foxhall (1996 above, note 22) 141; Todd (1993 above, note 10) 208. Concerning women as witnesses and the evidentary oath, see Osborne (2000 above, note 52) 80; Foxhall (1996) 143-4; and Todd (1990 above, note 11) 27-8 and (1993 above, note 10) 96 and 208.